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Man of might: Brigadier Berryman and the battles
of Merdjayoun and Jezzine, Syria, 1941
In June 1941 Brigadier Frank Berryman’s fearless and sometimes
unorthodox leadership was instrumental in the Allied capture of
Syria.
By Dr Peter J Dean

As the afternoon of the 14 June 1941 drew to a close Major John Wilton, 7th
Division, Australian Imperial Force (AIF), sat beneath a beautiful fig tree in
the town of Jezzine, Syria, and consumed “the most delicious figs [he’d] ever
eaten”. Apart from a few other scant occasions, this was the first opportunity
to relax since beginning of the Allied invasion of Vichy French Syria. Wilton
looked over to his commanding officer and mentor Brigadier Frank
Berryman, whom he greatly respected. Here was a man, thought Wilton,
whose fearless and sometimes unorthodox leadership had been instrumental
in the recent allied successes. Over the past week alone Berryman had
planned a number of major attacks, conducted reconnaissances beyond the
front line, accompanied the infantry in their assaults on two major strategic
towns, captured prisoners, and had almost ambushed ”friendly” tanks with
nothing more than a revolver.

Berryman had arrived at the 7th Division as its senior brigadier fresh from the
Libyan campaign. Under the command of Major-General John Lavarack, the
7th Division formed the backbone of the Allied invasion of Vichy French Syria
and Lebanon. The British, labouring under the false assumption that the
Vichy French would only put up limited resistance, allocated few aircraft, no
tanks, and limited infantry for the offensive. The Vichy French meanwhile
had air superiority, more infantry, and two-thirds of an armoured division on
hand. They were also were operating in terrain that was universally regarded
as suited to defensive operations. The failure of the British to provide air and
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tank support meant that Berryman’s artillery would be the sole major fire
support available to the 7th Division for most of the campaign.

The invasion commenced on the morning of 8 June 1941. The central thrust,
under Brigadier Alfred Baxter-Cox’s 25th Brigade, AIF, soon ground to a halt
and Lavarack ordered Berryman forward to assist Baxter-Cox to coordinate
his advance. Upon arriving at the front, Berryman was appalled to find
Baxter-Cox pushing his infantry into the attack without making use of his
attached artillery regiment. Lavarack, arriving on the scene the next morning,
removed the 2/6th Field Regiment from Baxter-Cox’s command and ordered
Berryman’s headquarters forward with orders to coordinate the advance.

Now in the leading role on the 25th Brigade front, Berryman organised for his
regiments to shell Fort Khiam on 9 June, as well as assisting the 2/33rd
Battalion’s assault on the village. In the afternoon Berryman organised a force
of Bren-gun carriers to test the strength of the defenders at Khirbe, while the
following day he conducted a reconnaissance for a deliberate assault against
the town of Merdjayoun two days hence.

These moves were not undertaken without considerable personal risk.
Berryman, together with his reconnaissance force consisting of Wilton and
Lieutenant Colonel Selwyn Porter, 2/31st Battalion, had advanced over 700
metres beyond the infantry’s forward defensive line in order to prepare the
attack on Merdjayoun. Berryman’s plan consisted of a flank attack on the high
ground of Ibeles Saki, to the east, by the 2/25th Battalion and an assault along
the main road to Merdjayoun by the 2/31st Battalion. Starting at 0230 hours
on 11 June 1941 the attack made good progress, supported by the heaviest
artillery bombardment of the campaign so far. Keen to maintain his presence
with the troops, Berryman pushed forward, entering Khirbe with the infantry
and personally capturing 12 prisoners.
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Despite the obvious risks, Berryman continued to press forward during the
attack, accompanying Porter and his troops as they entered Merdjayoun at
1300 hours. Porter noted, “As we approached the civic centre, the flag of
Lebanon broke at a mast head and we were invited to partake in champagne.”
Berryman accepted the town’s surrender and immediately moved his artillery
headquarters into the town.

The French continued to fire on the town and Berryman’s answer to this
persistence proved quite unorthodox. Lieutenant Colonel John O’Brien, 2/5th
Field Regiment, had reported that the rough country beyond Merdjayoun
made it difficult for his observation posts to locate the enemy artillery.
Berryman’s staff, however, could see the enemy gun flashes from the second
story of the headquarters’ building. Berryman, Wilton, and O’Brien went
upstairs and immediately started to engage the French guns from an upstairs
window by sending orders back to the 2/5th Field Regiment’s guns by
telephone. They then proceeded out onto the balcony to observe the fall of
shot. This action must be the only time during the war that an Australian
divisional artillery headquarters also acted as a forward observation post for
one of its own artillery regiments.

For most senior officers coordinating a major assault, entering the objective
with the leading troops, and then fulfilling the role of a forward artillery
observer would have been more than enough for one action. Berryman,
however, showing his characteristic abundance of energy, did not rest on his
laurels. He spent the next couple of days coordinating the town’s defence,
touring his batteries, and checking on his men. He then set off to join the 25th
Brigade’s advance on the town of Jezzine.

By morning on 14 June the advance guard of the 25th Brigade, consisting of
the 2/31st Battalion supported by a troop from the 2/6th Field Regiment and
a battery of the 2/2nd Anti-tank Regiment, had reached Kafr Houn. Soon
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after Lavarack arrived at 25th Brigade headquarters he ordered Berryman ”to
get Jezzine that night”.

Patrols reported that Green Hill, the dominant high ground that held the key
to Jezzine, was strongly held by the enemy. Berryman pushed forward to
coordinate an attack with Porter, who had refused to be evacuated despite
having been shot in the thigh by a French sniper at midday. As Porter’s men
closed in on Green Hill, Berryman arranged for a troop of 25-pounder guns to
close to within around 900 metres of the feature to support the assault.
Despite the difficult terrain the attack proceeded at 1800hrs and was a
complete success.

With Porter incapacitated due to his wound, Berryman moved forward.
Arriving on Green Hill to find the 2/31st Battalion consolidating its position,
Berryman ”looked down and saw the town of Jezzine … [and] a big column
of French troops moving to the north-east”. Grasping the importance of their
position he ordered the artillery forward observer to shell the French column
but the telephone line to the guns was down. In response Berryman turned to
the nearest company commander, asserting ”well, you can see that they’re
pulling out – go down and occupy the town.” The company set off down the
precipitous cliff face ”swinging down the terraces with the help of vines and
the branches of trees”.

Unwilling to be left behind Berryman forged on with the platoon, initially
waiting on the road as the men approached the town. As the light started to
fade, the increasingly anxious Berryman announced he was tired of waiting
and again set off to lead the advance. He halted inside the town as the troops
moved among the streets to clear them of the enemy. By now the sun had
faded and Berryman heard the unmistakable rumble of approaching tanks.
He knew that no Allied tanks had accompanied the force to Jezzine and,
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assuming that they were French tanks that had moved down from Damour to
resist the Australian advance he took action. Wilton later recalled:
There were some rather broken down farmhouses on the
side of the road, so Berryman said “We’ll hide ourselves in
here behind the wall … I think there are only two tanks”. We
looked back and there were just these dark objects coming
along the road … with the turrets open and the tank
commander standing up and looking out … We crouched
there with our pistols cocked. The tanks rumbled along and
just before the first tank passed me we heard a good
Australian voice … It was a troop of tanks from the 9th
Australian Division Cavalry, which by this time had got to
the road junction which led from Damour to Jezzine, and
they’d been sent out to make contact with our little party.
But they didn’t tell us, and those chaps were only about ten
seconds away from being shot.
Relieved at their good fortune Berryman and Wilton rode the light tanks into
Jezzine, where they found the leading infantry platoon drinking wine with
the town’s mayor. Berryman’s daring advance had forestalled the French plan
to occupy the town in strength the following day.

It was here that Berryman and Wilton were able to relax under the beautiful
fig tree. It had been an amazing week for the two officers. But the reprieve
would be only temporary, as the capture of Jezzine was not the end of the
campaign but rather marked the beginning of the most crucial phase of the
invasion. Before long Berryman was rushing back to Merdjayoun to take
command of an ad-hoc brigade in an attempt to stem the tide of a Vichy
French counter-attack that threatened the entire invasion. The tough first
week of fighting and the counter-attack proved to the British High Command
that Syria was no push over. Berryman fearless and unorthodox leadership
was to continue to play a major a role in the campaign as he, the 7th
Australian Division, and the newly operational 1st Australian Corps battled
through another month of hard fighting before victory was secured.
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